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ACCESS TO PUBLIC SCHOOL FACILITIES FOR RELIGIOUS 
EXPRESSION BY STUDENTS, STUDENT GROUPS AND 
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS: 
EXTENDING THE REACH OF THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE 
Ralph D. Mawdsley, ].D., Ph.D.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until Congress' passage of the Equal Access Act (EAA) 1 in 1984 and 
the Supreme Court's later decision in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches 
Union Free School District,2 public school districts had few constraints on 
prohibiting religious expression in their schools. In the EAA, Congress 
took the first step toward opening public schools to religious expression 
by creating a limited open forum in schools where non-curriculum-
related student groups were permitted to meet during non-instructional 
time. 3 In creating a statutory right of expression, Congress, in effect, 
reversed two earlier federal circuit decisions that had denied a 
constitutional right of expression.4 The Supreme Court's upholding of 
the constitutionality of the EAA in 1990 against a strong Establishment 
Clause challenge3 presaged the Court's unanimous decision6 three years 
later in Lamb's Chapel, which recognized that constitutional rights of free 
' Prof. of Educ. Administration, Cleveland St. U., Cleveland, Ohio; ).D., U. of III.; Ph.D., U. of Minn. 
I. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1988). The EAA provides that once a secondary school has created a 
"limited open forum," the school must permit all "noncurriculum related student groups" to meet 
"during non instructional time" regardless of the groups' "religious, political, philosophical, or other 
speech content." /d. 
2. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist. 508 U.S. 384 (1993) [hereinafter 
Lamb's Chapel]. 
3. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1988). 
4. See Brandon v. Bd. of Educ. of Guilderland C. Sch. Dist., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(holding that the Establishment Clause trumped the free exercise and free speech rights of student 
religious groups to meet on school premises); Lubbock Civ. Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. 
Dist., 669 f'.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982). 
5. Bd. ofEduc. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
6. While all justices concurred in the judgment, two separate concurring opinions were also 
gener<lted involving three justices. 
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speech expression applied to the K-12leveF 
Although Lamb's Chapel dealt with the expressive rights of a 
community organization (an evangelical church) as opposed to 
individual students or student groups,R the ice of resistance to religious 
activity in public schools had been broken. In Lamb's Chapel, the Court 
unanimously held that once a school district had permitted a non-
religious viewpoint on the subject of child rearing on its premises, it 
could not discriminate against a church's presentation of a religious 
viewpoint on the same subject.9 By prohibiting viewpoint 
discrimination, the Court created a constitutional floor of protection for 
religious expression. In the decade since Lamb's Chapel, the pressure on 
school boards from religious claimants to treat all religious expression 
the same as non-religious expression has been unrelenting. The purpose 
of this article is to examine how courts, in their more recent decisions, 
have addressed the religious speech claims of individual students, student 
groups, and community organizations. 
II. THE RANGE OF RELIGIOUS CLAIMS BEFORE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Both individuals and groups can make religious claims on public 
schools. Individual claims by students can involve a wide range of issues, 
such as religious meetings during non-instructional time, 10 wearing 
religious clothing or symbols, 11 making speeches, 12 or distributing 
7. Lambs Chapel, 508 U.S. at 396-97. Twelve years prior to Lamb's Chapel, the Courl, in 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), held that a state university that made its facilities generally 
available to registered student groups could not deny the use of its facilities (vacant classrooms and 
the student union) to a student religious group. The Court held that a limited open forum "docs not 
confer any imprimatur of state approval" on a religious group for purposes of the Establishment 
Clause, and refusal to recognize a religious group based on the content of its message is a violation of 
free speech. Id. at 274. The fact that twelve years had to intervene before free speech was applied to 
religious speech at the K-12 level reflects the tenacity of the judicial mindset that religion could be 
treated differently at the K-12level. 
8. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384. In Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that a church could 
show a six-part film series from Dr. james Dobson that approached child rearing from a Christian 
perspective during after-school hours at a high school, based on its finding that the school board had 
created a free speech limited public forum by permitting other perspectives of child rearing to be 
presented on its facilities. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 388 n. 3, 392 n. 5. 
9. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 396-97. 
10. See e.g. Ceniceros v. Bd. of Trustees of San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 106 f.3d H7X (9tb Cir. 
1997) (entitling students to meet for religious purposes during lunch). 
11. See e.g. Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding tbat Sikh student was 
entitled to wear a religious ceremonial knife). 
12. See e.g. Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2003) (tlnding that 
a principal's denial of a valedictorian's use of religious proselytizing comments in his speech was not 
a violation of free speech). 
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literature. 13 Students can make claims through their religious 
organizations as well. Those claims most frequently involve meeting 
space in school facilities, 14 availability of resources/ 5 and distribution of 
religious materials. 1" Community religious organizations also make 
demands of school officials, but their demands have been limited to 
asking for meeting space on school premises17 and requesting 
distribution of religious materials. 18 
Religious claims concerning public schools raise three legal issues. 
These three issues represent the precarious balance between the Free 
Speech (and, occasionally, the Free Exercise) Clause and the 
Establishment Clause. First, what religious practices should be allowed 
under free speech? Under Lamb's Chapel, a school that permits subject 
matter expression from a non-religious perspective during non-school 
hours cannot refuse a religious organization's viewpoint on the same 
subject. 1 ~ In other words, unless the school wants to prohibit all 
expression on a particular subject, it is required by free speech to allow a 
religious viewpoint where other viewpoints have been permitted.20 
Second, what religious practices are prohibited by the Establishment 
Clause? Some religious expression, such as school-organized or 
sponsored prayer at graduations21 or football games,22 are not permissible 
13. Sec e.g. Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding 
that an elementary student is not entitled to distribute candy canes with religious messages during 
classroom activities). 
14. See e.g. Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
students are entitled to form a religious club under EAA and meet on school premises like other 
student clubs). 
15. See e.g. Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 62 (2003) 
(holding that a student religious club is entitled under free speech to the same resources available to 
other student clubs). 
16. Sec e.g. Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 
2003) (finding that students were entitled to distribute religious messages attached to candy canes). 
17. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) [hereinafter Good News] 
(holding that the school district was required to permit a religious community club to meet on 
school premises immediately after school). 
18. See C.E.F. v. Stafford Township Sch. Dist., 233 F. Supp. 2d 647 (D. N.j. 2002) (holding that 
a religious community organization was entitled to distribute materials, post items on school walls, 
and have table space at back-to-school-nights). 
19. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 396-97. 
20. See also Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of U. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that 
the publication of a student religious organization is entitled to funding on the same basis as other 
publications from ditlering viewpoints). 
21. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that school organized graduation 
prayers violated the Establishment Clause). 
22. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that student initiated 
and student led prayer before football game violated the Establishment Clause). 
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because, under the Establishment Clause's endorsementc1 and 
psychological coercion24 tests, a school would be perceived as sponsoring 
religion and coercing participation in a religious activity. 
Third, what religious practices, even if not required under the free 
speech clause, are permissible because they do not violate the 
Establishment Clause? School graduations are controlled by school 
boards and school officials and are, essentially, non-public fora. 
However, school boards could choose to give control over the content of 
graduation speeches to the students. To the extent that school officials 
are willing to create what would be a limited public forum for student 
speeches during an otherwise school-controlled graduation, case law 
suggests that a student's speech with religious content might be 
permissible. 25 
III. COMMUNITY ACCESS TO SCHOOL PREMISES 
In 2001, the Supreme Court followed up on Lamb's Chapel with 
Good News Club v. Milford Central SchooZ.Z6 Invoking the same New 
York statute at issue in Lamb's Chapel, 27 the Milford School Board denied 
the Good News Club, a private Christian club for children between the 
ages of six and twelve, permission to hold meetings immediately after 
school at an elementary school, even though other community groups, 
such as the scouts and 4-H club, had been granted such permission.2x In 
finding a free speech violation, a strongly divided Coure9 held that the 
23. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring) (articulating 
her two-part endorsement test for the first time). 
24. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 577 (articulating for the first time Justice Kennedy's psychological 
coercion test to invalidate graduation prayer). 
25. Compare ]ones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding 
school board resolution permitting high school volunteers to deliver nonsectarian, non-proselytizing 
invocations at their graduation ceremonies) with ACLU v. Black Horse Reg/. Bd. o( Educ., 84 !'.3d 
1471 (3d Cir. 1995) (enjoining school board from permitting prayer at graduation based on senior 
votes on prayer or no prayer). See also Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 !'.3d 832 (9th C:ir. 
1998), decision withdrawn, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1999) (Prior to withdrawal of its decision, the court 
had upheld the school board's policy permitting four students with the highest GPAs to deliver a 
graduation speech that could take the form of "an address, poem, reading, song, musical 
presentation, prayer, or any other pronouncement." I d. at 834.). 
26. Good News, 533 U.S. at 98. 
27. N.Y. Educ. L. § 414 (McKinney 2000) (This statute authorizes local school boards to adopt 
reasonable regulations for the use of school property for ten specified purposes, including the 
holding of "social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to 
the welfare of the community." In interpreting this law, the school districts in both Lamb's Chapel 
and Good News prohibited the use of their school> for religious purposes.). 
28. Good News, 533 U.S. at 136 (Souter & Ginsburg, )J., dissenting). 
29. Although the vote was 6-3 to reverse the Second Circuit decision that had, in turn, 
reversed the federal district court's granting of summary judgment to the school district, Justice 
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school had violated the free expression rights of the Good News Club by 
refusing it permission to meet.30 The reasoning of the majority and 
dissenting opinions in the case 31 mirror in a broader perspective the 
fundamental differences among the Justices regarding the role of religion 
in public education. 
Justice Thomas, reflecting a religious accommodationist position, 
found that once the school had allowed other groups addressing morals 
and character development to use school facilities after school, "it [was] 
quite clear that Milford engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it 
excluded the [Good News] Club from the afterschool forum." 32 More 
importantly, characterizing the Club as "quintessentially religious" or 
"decidedly religious in nature" did not exclude it from free speech 
protection. 13 The school district lacked an Establishment Clause defense 
because "the Club's meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored 
by the school, and open to any student who obtained parental 
consent .... " 11 In interesting free speech dictum, the majority refused to 
permit use of a Heckler's Veto type argument by those desirous of 
restricting equal access simply because the youngest members of the 
audience might perceive the Club's presence on school premises as 
endorsement of religion. 35 
Breyer\ concurring opinion was barely a vote with the majority. Justice Breyer essentially reversed 
the court of appeals decision because the district court's summary judgment had been appealed and, 
thus, no decision on the merits had yet been made. He found that sufficient evidence existed to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing as to whether the c;ood News Club's presence at the school would 
satisfy the Establishment Clause's endorsement test. ln other words, Justice Breyer voted with the 
majority only on procedural grounds. Because five votes existed to decide the case on the merits, 
(Justice Thomas, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy), one 
cannot be certain how Justice Breyer would have voted if the case had been re-appealed to the Court 
on the meril.'-.. 
30. Good News, 533 U.S. at 109. 
31. Justice Thomas wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. justice Scalia also tlled a concurring opinion. Justice Breyer tiled an 
opinion concurring in part. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Souter, in which 
Justice c;insburg joined. 
32. Good News, 533 U.S. at 109. 
33. ld. at 111 . 
. l4. /d. at 113. 
35. Jd. at 11H-19. The concept of the Heckler's Veto owes its origin to Tcnninicl/o v. City of 
C!Ji. 337 U.S. 1 ( 1949), where the Court refused to limit the rights of expression in a public forum 
because of the nature of opposition to the views expressed. See also Capitol Square Rev. and Advisory 
lld. v. /'incite, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (In protecting the right of the KKK to display a cross on state property operated as a 
public forum, Justice O'Connor observed that, "because our concern is with the political community 
[at[ large ... the endorsement inquiry is not about the perceptions of particular individuals or saving 
isolated nonadherents from ... discomfort. . . . 1t is for this reason that the reasonable observer in 
the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and 
l<mnn in which the religious [speech takes place]."). 
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On the other hand, Justice Stevens, taking a religious separationist 
position in his dissenting opinion, argued that a school district could 
choose to allow student meetings that discuss topics from a religious 
point of view while, at the same time, prohibiting meetings that engage in 
"proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular religious faith." 36 This 
latter kind of meeting, "designed to convert children to a particular 
religious faith," he saw as "tend[ing] to separate young children into 
cliques that undermine the school's educational mission." 37 Justice 
Stevens' position was echoed in Justice Souter's dissent, where he opined 
that because the Club was holding "an evangelical service or worship 
calling children to commit themselves in an act of Christian 
conversion,"3R access to school facilities was outside the school's limited 
public forum. 
Despite its decision for the religious club, the Good News majority 
left three issues unresolved. First, the Supreme Court in Good News (and 
Lamb's Chapel, as well) did not determine whether the school districts 
had created limited public fora. In both cases, the parties had stipulated 
the existence of a limited public forum, thus obviating the need for the 
Court to determine whether one, in fact, had existed.39 As a result, one is 
left to speculate as to what the elements of a limited public forum might 
be. One possibility is that the requirements for a free speech limited 
public forum parallel those of an EAA limited open forum. The 
reasoning would be that, just as even one non-curriculum-related club is 
sufficient to invoke a limited open forum under the EAA,40 so also would 
even one non-religious viewpoint be sufficient to invoke free speech 
protection for a religious viewpoint.41 Although the Supreme Court has 
yet to address the merits regarding the elements of a limited public forum 
in a viewpoint discrimination case, several lower federal courts, as will be 
seen below, have begun making connections between the EAA and free 
speech:12 
36. Good News, 533 U.S. at 130 (Stevens,)., dissenting). 
37. !d. at 132. 
38. Jd. at 138 (Souter,)., dissenting). 
39. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391-92; Good News, 533 U.S. at 106. 
40. See e.g. East High Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 81 F. Supp. 
2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that a school board operated a limited open forum under EAA by 
permitting non-curriculum related groups to meet, and therefore, the high school would have to 
recognize the gay/lesbian group). 
41. See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391 n. 5 (identifying, for purposes of determining whether 
a limited open forum had been created by the public school, only one speech by a psychologist on the 
subject of human development); Good News, 533 U.S. at 108 (focusing on use of the premises by the 
Boy Scouts for character and moral development). 
42. Prince, 303 F.3d 1074 (discussed infra Part V); Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 
336 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussed infra Part V). 
269) SCHOOL ACCESS FOR RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION 275 
Second, can school boards prohibit groups that engage in religious 
worship from using their facilities? The Court in Good News sidestepped 
this question because, even though the Good News Club engaged in 
activities that were "quintessentially religious," it also engaged in 
instructive functions that were decidedly similar to those of the Boy 
Scouts, a non-religious group permitted to meet on school premises.43 
The Good News Club was clearly not a church, temple or synagogue that 
might engage in worship services proselytizing in nature, but since even 
the most religious of organizations is likely to engage in activities that 
have secular components, such as helping the poor, one wonders whether 
it will be easy for courts to draw clear lines between religious and secular. 
As a practical matter, one can query whether public school district 
officials can, or should, engage in dissecting the religious and secular 
functions of religious organizations to determine whether these 
organizations may have access to school district property.44 
Third, is the Good News majority suggesting that the distinction 
between viewpoints and subject matter in Lamb's Chapel has disappeared 
or, at least, is less apparent? In Lamb's Chapel, the Court held that once a 
public school district has opened its premises to particular subject matter 
(childrearing in Lamb's Chapel, and character and moral development in 
Good News), the district cannot discriminate against a viewpoint on that 
subject simply because it is religious.45 In blunting the school district's 
argument and the Court of Appeals reasoning in Good News that 
viewpoint discrimination did not apply to "quintessentially religious" 
uses, the Supreme Court came tantalizingly close to suggesting that every 
viewpoint, even one involving proselytizing worship services, might be 
protected under free speech.46 
43. Good News, 533 U.S. at 108. (In comparing the Good News Club to the Boy Scouts, the 
Court observed that "no one disputes that the Club instructs children to overcome feelings of 
jealousy, to treat others well regardless of how they treat the children, and to be obedient, even if it 
does so in a nonsecular way."). 
44. See Bronx Household of Faith v. Community Sch. Dist. No. 10, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003) 
[hereinafter Bronx II). (The Second Circuit noted that the federal district court, in granting 
injunctive relief to a church permitting it to hold religious services in a public school building on 
Sunday, had held that "the distinction between worship and other types of religious speech [is] one 
that cannot meaningfully be drawn by the courts." Id. at 354. However, the appeals court, in 
upholding the injunction, nonetheless "decline[ d] to review the trial court's ... determination 
that ... the distinction between worship and other types of religious speech cannot meaningfully be 
drawn by the courts." I d. at 354-55.). 
45. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 396-97. 
46. Good News, 533 U.S. at Ill. 
It is apparent that the unstated principle of the Court of Appeals' reasoning is its conclusion 
that any time religious instruction and prayer are used to discuss morals and character, the 
discussion is simply not a "pure" discussion of those issues. According to the Court of Appeals, 
reliance on Christian principles taints moral and character instruction in a way that other 
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Although the Good News majority never had to resolve this issue, one 
can speculate that if every religious expression is entitled to free-speech-
viewpoint protection, then the reason for determining the subject matter 
on which a viewpoint is based has ceased to exist. In essence, even 
"religious worship could not be treated as an inherently distinct type of 
activity. . . [and must be viewed as] comparable to other activities 
involving ritual and ceremony, such as Boy and Girl Scout meetings."47 
In a recent post-Good News Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision, 
Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of City of New York, 
(Bronx II) 48 the court, in reversing its earlier decision denying a church 
access to public school premises for Sunday worship services,49 cogently 
reflected the viewpoint/subject matter dichotomy yet unanswered by the 
Supreme Court: 
Would we be able to identify a form of religious worship that is 
divorced from the teaching of moral values? Should we continue to 
evaluate activities that include religious worship on a case-by-case basis, 
or should worship no longer be treated as a distinct category of speech? 
How does the distinction drawn in our earlier precedent between 
worship and other forms of speech from a religious viewpoint relate to 
the dichotomy suggested in Good News Club between "mere" worship 
on the one hand and worship that is not divorced from the teaching of 
moral values on the other?50 
IV. COMMUNITY DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
School boards frequently permit community groups to distribute 
brochures or fliers advertising their activities or programs to students in 
schools, usually at the end of the day when students are leaving. 5 1 While 
this distribution presents an inexpensive way for community 
organizations to promote programs of interest to children, brochures 
advertising religious programs invite Establishment Clause challenges. 
I d. 
foundations for thought or viewpoint do not. We, however, have never reached such a 
conclusion. 
47. Bronx II, 331 F.3d at 353-54. 
48. 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003) (considering the Good News decision to have reversed its 
earlier decision treating worship services as a subject not protected by viewpoint discrimination). 
49. Bronx Household of Faith v. Community Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 !'.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997) 
[hereinafter Bronx I] (upholding school district policy prohibiting use of its premises for religious 
purposes as not being viewpoint discrimination because worship services were a subject different 
from presentations from a religious perspective protected under Lamb's Chapel). 
50. Bronx II, 331 F.3d at 355. 
51. See e.g., Rusk v. Crestview Local Schs., 220 F. Supp. 2d 854, 855 (N.D. Ohio 2002). 
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However, because the Supreme Court has not addressed the distribution 
of religious materials, lower federal courts are left to apply Lamb's Chapel 
and Good News as best they can. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Hills v. Scottsdale Unified 
School District,52 addressed whether a school district that permitted non-
profit organizations to distribute literature through its schools could 
prohibit distribution of a summer camp brochure that included, among 
the nineteen courses offered, two classes on "Bible Heroes" and "Bible 
Tales."51 The school district's policy was to permit distribution of 
literature that promoted events and activities of interest to students, but 
not Hyers of a "commercial, political or religious nature."54 In addition to 
the Bible courses, the brochure contained the following language: "Did 
you know that if a child does not come to the knowledge of JESUS 
CHRIST and learn of the importance of Bible reading by the age 12 
chances are slim that they ever will in this life? We think it is important 
to start as young as possible!"55 
After initially permitting the brochure to be distributed, school 
district officials stopped the distribution, and then allowed it to resume 
with a disclaimer. 5" The district then changed course and refused to 
permit distribution, even with the disclaimer, then permitted distribution 
again with the disclaimer, and finally rescinded its permission to 
distribute the brochure altogether. School officials informed the 
organizer of the camp that he could resubmit the brochure if he would 
modify the brochure by "remov[ing] descriptions of the Bible classes, 
chang[ing] the spelling of "Sonshine" to "Sunshine," omit[ting] graphics 
of the Bible, cross and dove, and incorporate[ing] the disclaimer into the 
brochure."57 
After electing not to modify the brochure, the camp organizer filed 
suit, alleging violations of free speech, free exercise, equal protection, and 
due process. 5x 
Citing to both Lamb's Chapel and Good News, the Ninth Circuit, in 
reversing the federal district court's summary judgment for the school 
district, found that the district had created a limited public forum for free 
52. Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2003). 
53. !d. at 1047-4X. 
54. !d. at 1047. 
55. !d. at 1048. 
56. !d. (The disclaimer language was: "The Scottsdale Unified School District neither endorses 
nor sponsors the organization or activity represented in this document. The distribution of this 
material is provided as a community service.). 
57. /d. at I 048. 
5H. !d. 
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speech purposes.59 The school, in this case, intentionally opened what 
had been a nonpublic forum "to certain groups or topics," 60 and because 
the forum created had "a broad purpose" of providing a "community 
service"61 to notify students and parents of extra-curricular events, the 
school district could not "refuse to distribute literature advertising an off-
campus summer program because it is taught from a Christian 
perspective."62 As a result, "[i]f an organization proposes to advertise an 
otherwise permissible type of extra-curricular event, it must be allowed to 
do so, even if the event is obviously cast from a particular religious 
viewpoint .... "63 
The Hills court found no Establishment Clause problem because the 
brochures were sent home to parents who would make decisions 
regarding participation, and the distribution of the brochures at the end 
of the school day took them outside the part of the day devoted to 
"teacher's instruction and curriculum."64 Thus, without an 
Establishment Clause issue, the court was able to sidestep whether a 
school district's prohibiting the use of its facilities for religious use under 
the Establishment Clause constituted a compelling interest to offset a free 
speech viewpoint discrimination claim.65 
In C.E.F. v. Stafford Township School District,66 a federal district court 
in New Jersey reached a result similar to Hills by ordering two 
elementary schools67 to permit Child Evangelism Fellowship (CEF), a 
community religious organization, to hang brochures and posters on 
school walls (but not on bulletin boards), to permit teachers to distribute 
flyers and permission slips, and to permit the group access to tables at the 
school's Back-to-School Night.68 The court described the flyers as 
"lighthearted in tone, emphasizing that children will learn 'biblical 
principles, moral values, character qualities, [and] respect for authority' 
through Bible lessons, missionary stories, singing, and other activities.""9 
59. Id.at 1048-49. 
60. Id. at 1049. 
61. Id. at 1051. 
62. !d. at 1054. 
63. !d. at 1052. 
64. Id. at 1054. 
65. !d. at 1056 ("Because the District has not raised a valid Establishment Clause claim, we do 
not address the question whether such a claim could excuse the District's viewpoint 
discrimination."). 
66. 233 F. Supp. 2d 647 (D. N.j. 2002). 
67. !d. at 651. The two schools at issue were attended by students ages three to seven and ages 
eight to ten respectively. !d. 
68. !d. at 668. 
69. !d. at 651. 
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Even though some of the flyers were directed at children, the CEF 
required parent permission to participate in club activities, and, 
therefore, the court considered that "parents, not children, are the 
relevant audience."70 
The school district's written distribution policy in Stafford was that 
all distributed materials "should relate to school matters or community 
activities," and had to be "directly associated with the children who are 
enrolled" in the district. All materials were supposed to be approved by 
the superintendent, but certain organizations, such as the Boy Scouts, 
Girl Scouts, and the Four-H Club, had been granted permission by the 
school board to distribute materials without review.71 
In granting a preliminary injunction for the CEF, the court in 
Stafford held that the limited public forum analysis applied not only to 
school facilities, but also "to school personnel and communications 
systems to reach students."72 Although the court did not address the 
merits of the case, it nonetheless observed that "the school district's 
distribution, school-wall, and Back-to-School-Night fora [were] likely 
limited public fora" 73 with the result that "it [was] likely that the school 
district discriminated against the CEF based upon religious viewpoint."74 
Because the school district had permitted other groups that advertised 
activities "to promote character building and moral and social 
development,"75 the district could not prohibit expression by the CEF, 
even though its speech involved "bible instruction or 'quintessentially 
religious programs."'76 
Concerning the Establishment Clause, the Stafford court, like the 
Supreme Court in Good News, ultimately "found unpersuasive the 
argument that elementary school children would misperceive a state 
endorsement of religion or feel coercive pressure to participate in 
religious activities."77 Even though the CEF material was distributed by 
teachers to students while they were still in school, the court found that 
the limited public forum analysis applied because the distribution did not 
occur during the "instructional component of the school day."78 Similar 
to the Supreme Court's observation in Good News, the Stafford court 
70. I d. at 651 n. 2. 
71. I d. at 652. 
72. Id. at 656 n. 7. 
73. I d. at 659. 
74. I d. at 660. 
75. Id. 
76. I d. (quoting Good News, 533 U.S. at !08). 
77. Stafford, 233 F. Supp. at 663-65. 
78. I d. at 664. 
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refused to find endorsement of religion where "[i]t is the parents who 
choose whether their children will attend."79 Finally, the court followed 
the lead of Good News by rejecting a modified Heckler's Veto argument 
that "a group's religious activity can be proscribed on the basis of what 
the youngest members of the audience might misperceive."80 
The district court in Stafford, similar to the Ninth Circuit in Hills, 
also found that the school district lacked a defense under the 
Establishment Clause to justify its refusal to permit distribution of 
religious materials. 81 Without such an Establishment Clause defense, the 
Stafford court had no basis for considering whether a compelling interest 
existed to justify the school district's decision and whether that 
compelling interest was sufficient to trump the CEF's free speech claim. 
The federal courts in Bronx II, Hills, and Stafford have taken their 
lead from the Supreme Court in Good News in avoiding a direct 
confrontation between the Free Speech and the Establishment Clauses. 
The prominence of free speech analysis is evident even where a religious 
claim is denied. For example, in Stafford, in addition to the school walls 
and Back-to-School tables, the school district also had three bulletin 
boards designated for use by the PTA, the teacher's union (STEA), and 
area hospitals to which the CEF wanted access to post its materials. In 
upholding the school's refusal to permit the CEF access to the bulletin 
boards, the court used forum analysis and reasoned that the CEF was 
"not akin to the PTA, the STEA, or a local hospital"82 and, thus, the 
district had a "legitimate interest in preserving the property for the use to 
which it is lawfully dedicated."83 In other words, the school's designated 
forum for these three groups did not involve moral and character 
development and, thus, were closed to the CEF without the court having 
to consider whether providing access to the bulletin board would have 
violated the Establishment Clause. 
This designated forum approach is supported by the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in a non-religion-related decision, Goulart v. 
Meadows,84 where the court upheld a County Board of Commissioners' 
"Use Policy" that restricted use of its community centers for recreational 
and community activities but not "activities associated with meeting the 
79. Id. 
80. Jd. (quoting Good News, 533 U.S. at 119). 
81. Stafford, 233 F. Supp. at 665. 
82. !d. at 661. 
83. /d. (quoting Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 50-51 (I 983)) 
(upholding denial of access by a non-bargaining union to interschool mail use of faculty boxes where 
a union contract had granted exclusive use to the bargaining union, using a designated t(mun 
theory). 
84. Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F. 3d 239 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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State requirements for elementary or secondary education."85 Over a 
facial challenge to the board's "Use Policy" by home schooling groups 
who were excluded from using the centers for teaching courses to home 
schooled students for state educational credit, the Fourth Circuit held 
that "[i]t is reasonable for the Board to limit use of the community 
centers to recreational and community enrichment activities, and formal 
private education is not a use that is consistent with those purposes."8" 
Pursuant to its understanding of Good News, the court in Goulart found 
no free speech violation because the plaintiffs offered no evidence that 
their proposed private home schooling instruction "contained a 
particular or unique viewpoint ... in any ... area that they might wish to 
offer classes."H7 Consistent then with the result in the preceding 
paragraph concerning the three bulletin boards in Stafford, Goulart 
found that "the government may limit a designated or limited public 
forum to certain purposes, and exclude topics of speech or classes of 
speakers that are inconsistent with that purpose."88 
Stafford, unlike Goulart, involved a religious viewpoint; but even if 
religious viewpoints are at issue, not every federal court may choose to 
ignore the Establishment Clause as a limitation on such viewpoints. In 
Rusk v. Crestview Local Schools,H9 a school board had a policy permitting 
distribution of non-profit community group flyers, including religious 
flyers, at the end of the school day, as long as they publicized activities 
and did not promote the benefits of religion.90 At issue in Rusk were 
non-proselytizing flyers advertising "events at Christian churches that 
[featured] religious activities such as Christian fellowship, Bible stories, 
and 'songs that celebrate[d] God's love."'91 The school board's policy 
required the principal to review all materials to make certain they came 
H5. Id. at 242. The entire "Use Policy," as pertaining to private education contained the 
t(>llowing prohibited uses: 
d) Instructional, educational and related enrichment activities of the type usually offered in the 
public schools to children of school age, including activities in English language arts (such as 
reading, writing, and spelling), mathematics, science, social studies, art, music, health and 
physical education are prohibited, it being intended that the community centers not be used for 
such activities associated with meeting the State requirements for elementary or secondary 
education. This prohibition does not apply to activities conducted by any agency of the Calvert 
County Government, the Calvert County Public Library or the Calvert County Board of 
Education. 
ld. at 242. n. 2. 
86. ld. at 242. 
87. I d. at 257. 
88. I d. at 259. 
89. Rusk, 220 !'. Supp. 2d at 854. 
90. I d. at 855. 
9 I. I d. at 855-56. 
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from non-profit organizations, and then to pass them on to teachers for 
placement in students' homeroom mailboxes for retrieval at the end of 
the school day.92 Although the court found the school board's policy 
"relatively neutral,"93 it invoked the Lemon v. Kurtzman 94 tripartite test to 
find that the policy advanced religion in violation of the Establishment 
Clause.95 The court found that, because proselytization occurred at 
events advertised in the flyers,% the non-proselytizing nature of the flyers 
did not keep their distribution from violating the Establishment Clause.97 
Despite what appeared to be the Establishment Clause trumping the 
religious organization's right of access to the school to distribute its 
flyers, the court wavered in the end and reasserted the preeminence of 
Good News' viewpoint discrimination and free speech right of access. 
"Forbidding religious organizations from advertising activities at which 
proselytization will occur in an elementary school does not equate to 
denying access to an organization based on its viewpoint."98 
For school districts affected by Rusk (the northern district of Ohio), 
the difficult task has become determining whether religious 
organizations have any right of access at all to distribute flyers. 99 
Religious organizations that have as part of their mission the impartation 
92. I d. at 855. 
93. I d. at 859. 
94. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). With Rusk"s resurrection of the Lemon test, one 
is reminded of justice Scalia's satiric comment in Lamb's Chapel: 
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles 
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center 
Moriches Union Free School District. 
I d. at 398 (Scalia,)., concurring). 
95. Rusk, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 856-59. The three prongs of the Lemon tests are: "whether a 
statute, practice, or policy (1) has a legitimate secular purpose; (2) has a primary effect of advancing 
or inhibiting religion; and (3) fosters an excessive entanglement between government and religion." 
Id. at 856 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13). 
96. See Rusk, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 860 ("[t]he flyers that Steve Rusk has submitted urge 
attendance at events that clearly involve an element of proselytizing .... Given the religious 
overtones of the activity, the age of the target audience and the heightened possibility that due to 
their youth the children may not appreciate the neutral stance that the school claims to take with 
regard to these activities, the practice of distributing these materials to elementary school students 
fails to pass the endorsement test."). The only evidence presented to this effect were two flyers 
"advertis[ing] events at Christian churches that feature[d] religious activities such as Christian 
fellowship, Bible stories, and 'songs that celebrate God's love."' Id. at 855-56. 
97. I d. at 859-60. 
98. I d. at 860. 
99. The school district's confusion is reflected in Rusk v. Crestview Local Sch. Dist., 2002 WI. 
31506166 (N.D. Ohio 2002). In that case, Crestview Local School District sought claritlcation as to 
what religious materials might be permissible under the judge's injunction. Ultimately, the judge 
rather obtusely determined that nothing was confusing in his order and, if it were, the school could 
submit flyers to the court on an ad hoc basis for a decision as to their appropriateness. 
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of their religion-based values to young persons attending their events 
would seem to be foreclosed by the Establishment Cause from access to 
the public school forum. Whether the Rusk court has found a method of 
prohibiting religious access under the Establishment Clause, while 
maintaining the facade of free speech right of access and viewpoint 
discrimination, remains to be seen. 100 
Using the same Lemon test as the Rusk court, another federal district 
court in the Sixth Circuit, in Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter School 
Academy,101 refused to invalidate a school practice permitting 
distribution of religious materials to elementary students in their "Friday 
folders" which students took home with them at the end of the day. 102 
The court in Daugherty found the school's policy of "allow[ing] 
community groups to distribute information that may be relevant to the 
students and parents regarding community activities and events"103 to be 
neutral under the Establishment Clause.104 In reaching this conclusion, 
the court in Daugherty saw the balance between the Establishment Clause 
and free speech in a way quite different from Rusk. Daugherty relied on a 
Fourth Circuit decision, Peck v. Upshur County Board of Education, 105 
where the Peck court had reasoned that, 
to require the [School] Board to exclude religious literature as such 
from the forum it has created to further the schools' educational 
mission by exposing the county's students to a variety of age 
appropriate private speech would evince the hostility toward religious 
speech that the Establishment Clause does not require and that the Free 
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses forbid. 106 
Daugherty, like Bronx II, Hills, and Stafford, avoided a direct 
confrontation between Free Speech and the Establishment Clauses, 
preferring instead to find no viable Establishment Clause claim. 107 Rusk 
notwithstanding, the access arguments of community religious 
organizations have prevailed primarily because treating these 
organizations differently from others would evidence viewpoint 
discrimination prohibited by the Free Speech Clause. In the absence of 
100. The Rusk court's aversion to anything religious is reflected in its comment that 
"advertisements promoting a food drive sponsored by a local church or temple to benefit the poor of 
the community, or even a youth sports league ... would pass the constitutionality tests as I interpret 
them." Rusk, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 860. 
101. Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter Sch. Academy, 116 F. Supp. 2d 897 (W.O. Mich. 2000). 
102. Jd.at911-12. 
103. Id. at 911. 
104. Id. at 911-12. 
105. Peck v. Upshur County Bd. ofEduc., 155 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 1998). 
106. Daugherty, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 911, quoting Peck, 155 F.3d at 284. 
107. Daugherty, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 911-12. 
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preferential treatment for religious community organizations, 10x courts 
seem disposed to let a kind of evenhandedness prevail in free speech 
access cases. 109 
V. STUDENT ACCESS TO SCHOOL FACILITIES 
Student religious access issues in public schools provide a greater 
stress on the relationship between the Free Speech and Establishment 
Clauses, primarily because the issue involves students interacting with 
other students during the school day, when state compulsory attendance 
laws require them to be in school. 110 If students can conduct religious 
meetings or distribute religious literature during the school day, when 
students are required to be at school, the circuit breaker defense used in 
Hills and Stafford, namely that the materials are really being sent home at 
the end of the school day for the parents, does not work. Not only might 
parents be unaware that their children are receiving and reading religious 
literature at school in this situation, but they might also be oblivious that 
their children are attending religious meetings. To the extent, then, that 
students interacting with other students on religious issues in the 
relatively closed school environment invokes concerns about peer 
pressure to change religious views, what constraints, if any, should courts 
impose on student religious access issues? 
Perhaps surprisingly, courts have been fairly protective of student 
religious access. With its decision in Prince v. facoby, 111 the Ninth Circuit 
has taken the lead in this area, as it had with community organizations in 
Hills, by protecting students' right of religious access at school under the 
108. See e.g. id. at 911 ("If [the school board] manipulated the facially neutral policy so as to 
give preferential access to religious literature or certain religious literature, then an Establishment 
Clause violation might be made out.") (quoting Daugherty, 116 F.3d at 284); Santa Fe lndep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (Although not a community organization case, the Santa Fe court 
invalidated a school policy permitting students to vote on whether to have a prayer before football 
games, except where the past history of the school district had included considerable identification 
with religion including having a school chaplain.). 
109. The concept of evenhandedness as a definition of neutrality has arisen in government aid 
to religion cases, where it has not received wide acceptance among members of the Supreme Court. 
See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 838-40 (2000) (O'Connor, j., concurring) (disputing the concept 
as defining neutrality); id. at 876-77 (Souter, j., dissenting). Notwithstanding, evenhandedness has 
more affinity with free speech, where viewpoint discrimination is already embedded in the 
understanding of neutrality. 
110. See Ill. ex rei. McCollum v. Bd. ofEduc. ofSch. Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, 333 U.S. 
203 (1948). In striking down the district's permitting clergy to hold religious meetings on school 
premises during the school day, the Court found relevant that "[t]he operation of the state's 
compulsory education system ... assist[ed] and [was] integrated with the program of religious 
instruction carried on by separate religious sects." I d. at 209. 
111. Prince, 303 F.3d at 1074. 
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Free Speech Clause. In Prince, the court addressed a high school 
student's claim that her school district's refusal to recognize World 
Changers, a religious club to which she belonged, as an Associated 
Student Body club (ASB), constituted a violation of the Equal Access Act 
(EAA) and Free Speech Clause. 112 The high school operated a dual 
student group recognition system, Associated Student Body and Policy 
5225 (Policy). Recognition as an ASB club brought a significant number 
of benefits to its members. ASB groups, for example, shared funds from 
the sale of ASB cards, and were permitted to sell crafts at the school's 
craft fair, to participate in the ASB auction, and to engage in other 
fundraisers. In addition, ASB groups could meet during student/staff 
time during the school day (10:10-10:40 a.m.), where attendance was 
taken, had access to school supplies, audio/visual equipment, and the PA 
system, were given free inclusion of the club's picture in the yearbook, 
and were permitted to use school vehicles. 113 Policy groups, on the other 
hand, received none of the above benefits and could meet only if they 
satisfied rules requiring that their meetings: (1) be voluntary and student-
initiated; (2) not be sponsored by the school or its staff; (3) be held at 
times that did not interfere with the school; (4) be the responsibility 
solely of students for conduct; (5) have student participation that was 
voluntary; (6) not use school funds; (7) not compel staff to attend; and, 
(8) respect the constitutional rights of all students. 114 
The Ninth Circuit decided that the school district, in denying World 
Changers' ASB recognition and benefits, did not violate the EAA because 
the meetings would not occur during non- instructional time. 115 
However, denying World Changers' ASB recognition and benefits did 
violate the Free Speech Clause. The court reasoned that the student/staff 
meeting time and the provision of school supplies and equipment were 
required under the Free Speech Clause because the district had created 
a limited public forum in which student groups [were] free to meet 
during student/staff time, as well as to use school vehicles for field trips, 
to have priority for use of the A V equipment, and to use school supplies 
112. I d. at I 077. 
113. /d. at 1078. 
114. /d. at 1077. The EEA, contains similar language in its definition of "fair opportunity 
criteria." 20 U.S.C:. § 4071(c). 
115. The court determined that EAA did not apply to the student/staff meeting time; since it 
occurred during the school day and attendance was taken, it did not qualify as "noninstructional 
time." Prince, 303 F.3d at 1087-89; 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b). Regarding participation in the craft fair, 
school auction, fund raising, and free appearance in the yearbook, the court held that EAA was not 
applicable because the funding carne from the sale of ASB cards, not school district funds. Prince, 
303 !'.3d at tORS. 
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such as markers, posterboard, and paper.116 
Providing these services to World Changers would not violate the 
Establishment Clause because providing the services would be done on "a 
neutral basis [that] ... is secular in content," essentially meaning that all 
groups would have equal access to the materials and vehicles. 117 
Worth noting in Prince is the court's interpretation of the 
Establishment Clause as requmng only neutrality, a kind of 
evenhandedness "providing equal access to a 'service' that happens to be 
paid for by public funds." 118 The court dispelled any notion that students 
might perceive a religious club meeting during school hours as being 
endorsed by the school because "the School District here can dispel any 
'mistaken inference of endorsement' by making it clear to students that a 
club's private speech is not the speech of the school."119 
Prince is the third Ninth Circuit decision 120 addressing religious 
groups meeting on school premises and represents the farthest reach of 
the Free Speech Clause yet into public schools. After Prince, at least 
within the Ninth circuit, a limited public forum can exist during a period 
of the school day, even if attendance is taken, as long as other student 
groups are permitted to meet. 
The Third Circuit, in Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area School 
Board, 121 reached a result similar to Prince, relying both on EAA and free 
speech to require that a student religious club, FISH, have the same 
opportunity to meet as secular student clubs. 122 The court in Donovan, 
however, pressed the application of the EAA further than the Ninth 
Circuit had been willing to do in Prince. While the Ninth Circuit had 
116. Prince, 3031:'.3d. at 1091. 
117. Id. at 1094. 
118. Id. The Prince Court looked to Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 794 (2000), for support. Prince, 
303 F.3d at 1093-1094. In Mitchell, the Court upheld the loan of supplies and materials to religious 
schools as long as they were neutral, that is, secular in content. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835-36. 
119. Prince, 303 F.3d at 1094, (quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 251). In Mergens, the Court had 
declared more broadly that: 
[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the 
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the free Speech and 
Free Exercise Clauses protect. We think that secondary school students are mature enough and 
are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely 
permits on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
496 U.S. at 251 (emphasis added). 
120. The first two decisions were Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 
1993), where the court held that the EAA applied to a religious groups meeting before school at a 
time when other groups could meet, and Ceniceros v. Bd. of Trustees of San Diego Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 
878 (9th Cir. 1997), where the court held that EAA applied to lunch where no classroom instruction 
occurred and the school operated an open campus during lunchtime. 
121. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2003). 
122. Id. at 214. 
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found the EAA inapplicable to a staff/student meeting period during the 
school day, the Third Circuit held that a half-hour activity period at the 
beginning of the school day constituted "non-instructional time" for 
purposes of EAA. 
The Donovan court reasoned that, even though attendance was taken 
during the activity period (as had been the case in Prince), academic 
instruction did not begin at the school until 8:54 a.m. when the activity 
period ended. Using a picturesque metaphor, the Third Circuit quaintly 
observed that "[j]ust as putting a 'Horse' sign around a cow's neck does 
not make a bovine equine, a school's decision that a free-wheeling 
activity period constitutes actual classroom instructional time does not 
make it so." 123 Invoking the Supremacy Clause, 124 the Third Circuit 
ignored the school district's argument that the half-hour was used in 
calculating the state minimum number of hours by declaring that state 
law cannot frustrate rights under federal law. 125 In ruling against the 
school district on viewpoint discrimination grounds, the court held that 
"FISH ... discusse[d] current issues from a biblical perspective and [that] 
school officials [had] denied the club equal access to meet on school 
premises during the activity period solely because of the club's religious 
nature." 126 
However, like the Good News, Bronx II, Hills, and Stafford courts 
before it, the Third Circuit in Donovan also refused to address whether 
an Establishment Clause violation might constitute a sufficiently 
compelling interest to overcome free speech protection. 127 As in the 
other cases, Donovan sidestepped a confrontation between the Free 
Speech and Establishment clauses because, citing to Good News, 
"allowing the Club to speak on school grounds would ensure neutrality, 
not threaten it." 128 Again, the court categorized neutrality as a kind of 
evenhandedness where the plaintiff in Donovan "merely [sought] an 
equal opportunity to express herself along with other like-minded 
students." 129 
Access issues for students include not only meeting times, but 
distribution of religious materials as well. A federal district court, in 
123. I d. at 224. 
124. U.S. Con st., Art VI, § 2 ("This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... "). 
125. Donovan, 336 l'.3d at 224. 
126. /d. at 226. 
127. /d. (refusing to "confront this thorny issue" because the court determined that the school 
district had no valid Establishment Clause issue). 
128. /d. (quoting Good News, 533 U.S. at 114). 
129. Donovan, 336 F.3d at 227. 
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Westfield High School L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield,uo reached much 
the same result on the free speech issue of the distribution of candy canes 
with a religious message as did Donovan for meeting time for religious 
clubs. In Westfield, a school district superintendent had created a policy 
prohibiting the distribution of "non-school curriculum or activity related 
literature of any kind directly to other students on school grounds." 131 
The school district's written policy also required that all materials to be 
distributed had to be approved in advance by the principal. 132 
Pursuant to this policy, members of a religious club (L.I.F.E.) 
presented a candy cane with an attached religious message for review by 
the high school principal. The message contained information about the 
religious club, 133 the text of a Bible verse, 134 an explanation of the religious 
significance of the red and white colors of the candy cane, 135 and an 
exhortation that "it is trusting Jesus Christ that saves you." 136 When the 
principal in Westfield read the religious message he prohibited its 
distribution because he found it to be "offensive."137 Despite the religious 
club members not having permission to distribute the candy canes, they 
did so anyway and were penalized with a one-day, in-school 
suspension. 13H However, the suspensions were stayed pending parent 
appeal and were never served by the students. 139 
A federal district court, relying on free speech analysis, enjoined 
Westfield High School from enforcing its "non-curriculum related 
literature" policy, from enforcing any penalty on the students, from 
imposing a prior restraint on distributing literature with a religious 
message, and from prohibiting students' distribution of religious 
literature during non-instructional time or penalizing students who did 
so. 140 Using the strongest language possible, the court laid the 
responsibility for compliance with the free speech rights with the 
principal. When the principal defended his denying permission for 
130. Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 98. 
131. Id. at 104. 
132. Id. at 103. 
133. ld. at 104 (the meeting day, time and place for the religious club). 
134. Id. at 105 ("And this is my prayer: that your love may abound more and knowledge and 
depth of insight, so that you may be able to discern what is best and may be pure and blameless until 
the day of Christ, filled with the fruits of righteousness that comes through Jesus Christ-to the glory 
and praise of God." Philippians 1: 9-11.). 
135. !d. (The white represents the purity of jesus and the red represents the blood that he shed 
on the cross.). 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. I d. at 106. 
139. ld. at 107. 
140. Id. at 129. 
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distribution of the religious messages because he did not understand that 
the students wanted only to distribute them during non-instructional 
time, the court responded with a stinging rebuke: 
A students' free speech rights should not hinge upon how he or she 
words the question ('Can I pass out candy canes?' versus 'Can I pass out 
candy canes during non-instructional time in a manner that will not 
cause any disruption or disorder within the school?'), especially when it 
is the school administrator who is more likely to possess a working 
knowledge of school policies and the law. 141 
Although the Westfield court, in granting the plaintiffs' motion for a 
preliminary injunction, never reached the merits of the case, the court's 
free speech analysis strongly suggests that plaintiffs would have prevailed 
on the merits. In the court's hierarchy of speech in school settings, the 
greatest degree of school control includes, at one end, "unfettered control 
over content" by school officials "of government speech (i.e., a principal 
speaking at a school assembly)," followed by "school sponsored speech 
(i.e., a teacher editing a curriculum-based newspaper that is a part of a 
journalism class)." 142 At the other end, however, is "private, school-
tolerated speech (i.e., student speaking to another during lunch break)" 
which can be controlled by the school only "to the extent [that] it 
substantially disrupts or materially interferes with the school's 
disciplinary concerns."143 
The court turned to Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District144 to determine whether the student's distribution of candy 
canes with their religious messages had been disruptive. 145 In Tinker, the 
Supreme Court had declared that restricting student speech in a school 
setting required 
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint .... [It 
required a] finding ... that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 
'materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.'146 
The Westfield court pointedly observed that, 
[ t] here is nothing in the evidence before the Court to suggest that other 
students were not free to decline the candy canes, that the student 
141. Id. at 112. 
142. Id. at 114 n. 13. 
143. Id. 
144. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 ( 1969). 
145. Westjield, 249 r. Supp. 2d at 109. 
146. ld. at 509. 
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plaintiffs coerced others into accept [sic] their message, that the student 
plaintiffs invaded the rights of others not to receive literature by, for 
example, stuffing lockers, or that the student plaintiffs blocked other 
students from entering class, actions which could constitute even 
substantial interference and justify restricting distribution to a more 
reasonable time, manner, and place.147 
In a sweeping indictment of the manner in which the school 
principal had handled the religious club's distribution of the candy canes, 
the court held that the plaintiffs constitutional rights were protected 
from the moment that she "walked onto the grounds of Westfield High 
School ... [to share] candy canes and religious messages with her fellow 
students .... "148 The school principal, in order to prove disruption under 
Tinker, had a higher standard to meet than his own personal offense to 
the religious message. 149 
The school district had further argued in Westfield, as almost a dying 
gasp, that the religious club was school-sponsored, and, as such, the 
district could control it under Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. 150 
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court found a principal's removal of two 
pages from a school newspaper, which had been prepared as part of a 
journalism class, to be constitutional, and upheld "educators' authority 
over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other 
expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public 
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." 151 In 
finding Hazelwood inapposite, the Westfield court observed that although 
"[a]ny student group meeting on school premises may arguably be 
characterized as school-sponsored152 ••• [r]ather, for expressive activity 
to be school-sponsored, the school needs to take affirmative steps in 
promoting the particular speech." 153 
As the court observed in Westfield, the very distance that the high 
school had maintained between itself and the L.I.F.E. club, so as not to 
offend the Establishment Clause, assured that the school could never be 
considered as sponsoring the club for purposes of Hazelwood. 
147. Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 112. 
148. Id. at 114 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
149. See Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 116. (In paraphrasing Tinker, the Westfield court 
observed that "a school's unsubstantiated apprehension of disruption is insufficient justification for 
suppressing students' rights to free speech .... "). 
150. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (holding that a school needed only 
a reasonable basis for deleting material from a school newspaper prepared as part of a curriculum-
related activity). 
151. Id. at 271. 
152. Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 115. 
153. Id. at 117. 
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The school does not fund the Club; the Club's activities are not directly 
related to any subject taught in any course that the school offers; the 
school does not require any student to participate in the group; the 
school does not give club members academic credit for participation in 
the L.I.F.E. Club. 154 
291 
As with the other cases discussed in this article, the court in Westfield 
did not have to address a conflict between Free Speech and the 
Establishment Clause. As the court observed, "the candy cane 
distributions [were] expressive activities" and, without any support for 
the school's sponsorship argument that "it [was] affirmatively promoting 
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause,"155 the religious club's 
free speech claim prevailed because the school district had no viable 
Establishment Clause argument. 156 
Westfield raised the question about student club access/distribution 
during non-instructional time during the school day, particularly during 
the parts of the school day spent outside of the classroom. Still 
unanswered, however, is what free speech rights, if any, would (or, 
should) students have if distribution is to occur in the classroom? 
The Third Circuit, in Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Township 
Board of Education, 157 addressed an issue similar to Westfield. In W alz, 
the court dealt with an elementary student's alleged free speech right to 
distribute candy canes with religious messages 15R during classroom 
parties. 159 In Walz, a parent of a pre-kindergarten student, in response to 
a Parent Teacher Organization request for "candy, pencils, whatever" for 
distribution to other students responded by sending pencils containing 
the message, '"Jesus [Loves] The Little Children' (heart symbol)." 160 The 
school district superintendent refused to permit the pencils to be 
distributed because the students' "parents might perceive the message as 
being endorsed by the school."161 Six months later, the district's board of 
education adopted a policy that provided, in part, that "no religious belief 
or non-belief shall be promoted in the regular curriculum or in district-
sponsored courses, programs or activities, and none shall be 
154. I d. alliS. Cf Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262-63,268-69. 
155. Westjield, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 120. 
156. The Westfield court did observe, however, that had the religious club's speech been 
school-tolerated, it "would likely violate the Establishment Clause." Id. at 113. 
157. Walz, 342 F.3d at 271. 
158. The messages attached to the candy canes varied from "Jesus Loves the Little Children" to 
a longer religious story incorporating the red and white colors of the candy cane as "symbols for the 
birth, ministry, and death of)esus Christ." !d. at 273-74. 
159. Id.at273-75 
160. Id at 273. 
161. !d. 
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disparaged." 162 At Christmastime shortly thereafter, when the student 
was a kindergartner, the parent sent candy canes with an attached 
message, virtually identical to that in Westfield, about the religious 
significance of the red and white colors. The student handed these to his 
classmates in the hallway, apparently without incident. A year later, 
when the student was a first-grader, he was prohibited from handing out 
similar candy canes at a classroom party, but was permitted by school 
officials "to distribute the candy canes in the hallway outside the 
classroom, at recess, or after school as students were boarding buses." 163 
At this point, the student, through his parent, tlled suit against the 
school district alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. 104 The 
Third Circuit, in upholding summary judgment for the school district, 
relied on the same Hazelwood decision that the Westfield court had 
considered inapposite to its set of facts. Citing to Hazelwood, the W alz 
court held that 
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial 
control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 165 
In Walz, the school's curricular purpose, "to teach social skills and 
respect for others in a festive setting," 166 prevailed over the individual 
student's candy cane distribution. As the court noted, "[t]here is a 
marked difference between expression that symbolizes individual 
religious observance, such as wearing a cross on a necklace, and 
expression that proselytizes a particular view." 167 
The student's allegation of "hostility toward religion," 16H an allegation 
that had carried the day in Daugherty, went nowhere in W alz. The court 
found, instead, that where classroom activities with clearly defined 
curricular purposes are at issue, neutrality has another side. In this case, 
the school district was neutral toward religion because it "prohibit[ ed] all 
endorsements of specific messages, including those with commercial, 
political, or religious undertones." 169 In other words, "by bringing gifts 
that promoted a specific religious message," 170 the student was treated no 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 274. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 280-81 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273). 
166. Walz, 342 F.3d at 279. 
167. Id. at 278-79. 
168. I d. at 279 n. 6. 
169. Id. 
170. I d. at 280. 
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differently than would a student, presumably, who sought to hand out 
bumper stickers for a political candidate. 
Unquestionably, the result in Walz was influenced by the age of the 
students. As the Third Circuit observed: 
[I]n an elementary school classroom, the line between school-endorsed 
speech and merely allowable speech is blurred, not only for the young, 
impressionable students but also for their parents who trust the school 
to confine organized activities to legitimate and pedagogically-based 
goals. 171 
Nonetheless, although the student in Walz lost in his free speech 
claim, the court made two significant comments regarding free speech in 
elementary schools that are worth noting. First, while the school 
permitted the student to distribute the candy canes in the school hallway 
after class and at recess, the court observed that "[t]his accommodation 
seems more than reasonable and perhaps even unnecessary." 172 Second, 
the court observed that, in an elementary classroom setting, "[i]ndividual 
student expression that articulates a particular view but that comes in 
response to a class assignment or activity would appear to be 
protected." 17 ' The court went on to note, consistent with Tinker, that 
"individual student expression that is or is likely to be disruptive may be 
properly restricted."174 
Although these two comments are dicta, they provide grist for the 
free speech mill. What implications might they have for future litigation? 
In the first comment, it is unclear what the court meant by its 
observation that a school may not need to accommodate an elementary 
student's request to hand out religious materials in other-than-classroom 
settings because it would be "unnecessary." Is accommodation 
unnecessary because elementary students are involved and elementary 
students are more impressionable,175 or is the accommodation 
unnecessary only because the school has not created a limited public 
forum? While the Third Circuit observed that kindergarten and first 
171. I d. at 277. 
172. /d. at 280. 
173. I d. at 279. 
174. I d. 
175. Courts lend to be protective of elementary students because of their impressionability. See 
e.g. Wallace v. fa[free, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (rejecting a state law authorizing a period of silence for 
voluntary prayer in a matter that involved a kindergarten student); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 ("[A] 
school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in 
determining whether to disseminate student speech in potentially sensitive topics, which might 
range from the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage 
sexual activity in a high school setting."). 
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grade "children are most impressionable," 171i one can argue that control 
over school curriculum by school officials should be limited only to the 
classroom. 177 Thus, Walz leaves open the possibility that, even in an 
elementary school, a limited public forum could be created for non-
classroom areas, allowing distribution of religious material as long as 
school officials have permitted students to distribute non-religious 
materials in those areas. 
The second comment regarding student expressive rights attendant 
to "a class assignment or activity" is more problematic. If the court is 
suggesting that students have some measure of free speech rights to 
religious expression with regard to class assignments or activities, that 
would be a dramatic turn of events. Whether the Third Circuit intended 
to create such a right might be doubtful in light of its earlier decision in 
C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva 178 where an en bane court found no school 
board liability for an alleged free speech violation when an elementary 
student's religious artwqrk from a class assignment was taken from its 
original location in the school hallway and hung in a less visible place. 179 
Other courts have found that free speech does not extend into the 
classroom either because school boards have considerable control over 
curriculum under Hazelwood180 or because classrooms are non-public 
fora. 181 However, one must note that a vigorous dissent in the evenly 
divided C.H. case would have permitted the student to go to trial on the 
issue of viewpoint discrimination because 
public school students have the right to express religious views in class 
discussion or in assigned work, provided that their expression falls 
within the scope of the discussion or the assignment and provided that 
176. Walz, 342 F.3d at 277. "As a general matter, the elementary school classroom, ~.speciall)' 
for kindergartners and first graders, is not a place for student advocacy. To requirl' a school lo 
permit the promotion of a specific message would infringe upon a school's kgitim.tk .1rea of 
control." !d. 
177. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 277. 
178. C.H. ex rei. Z.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (en bane). 
179. !d. at 200. C.H. represented an evenly divided Third Circuit where the opinion of the 
court was based on a finding of no liability because no evidence of a custom or practice of violating 
religious free speech had been presented, while the dissent found evidence of viewpoint 
discrimination. Id. 
180. See e.g. Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1'•·l5) (upholding teacher\ 
refusal for student to write a biography on jesus Christ, even though the teacher made both errors of 
fact and law regarding religion). 
181. See Muller v. jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530 (7th Cir. 1996); Miles v. /)cnvcr Pu/1. 
Schs., 944 f.2d 733 (lOth Cir. 1991); Murray v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 919 F. Supp. H.lH IW D. l'a. 
[996). 
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the school's restriction on expression does not satisfy strict scrutiny.1R2 
Because of the ambiguity of the Walz court's language, one will have 
to await further litigation to see whether the Third Circuit intends to 
move in the direction of adopting the C. H. court's dissenting views and 
introduce some measure of free speech into the classroom. 
The tension between a student's interest in free speech, unfettered by 
viewpoint discrimination, and a school's interest in controlling its 
educational mission under Hazelwood came to a head in a recent 
Michigan federal district court decision, Hansen v. Ann Arbor Public 
Schools. 1K' Hansen presents a different kind of access issue, namely the 
right of a student to present an unpopular religious point of view. In 
Hansen, as part of diversity week, a school permitted the school's 
Gay/Straight Alliance to organize a panel on Homosexuality and Religion 
that included local clergy with views favorable to homosexuality. 184 
Although school officials had initially opened up participation on the 
panel to students, it ended up denying the request of a student member 
(plaintiff-Hansen) of a religious club, Pioneers for Christ, to be a member 
of the panel because of her views against homosexuality. A school 
principal later offered the student an opportunity to give a speech at an 
assembly on the topic, "What Diversity Means to Me," but, after 
submitting her speech to a principal, she was required by school officials 
to delete comments as to why she thought that homosexuality was 
wrong. Plaintiff filed suit against the school district and school officials 
under a number of legal theories, the most important being violations of 
Free Speech and the Establishment Clause. In granting the plaintiff 
injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory relief for violation of her 
rights under the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, the court 
observed that school officials had 
censored Betsy's speech, finding objectionable that portion of her 
speech in which she expressed that she could not accept sexual 
orientation or religious teachings that she believes are wrong ... [and 
their denial of her] representation on the Homosexuality and Religion 
panel was similarly motivated by their disagreement with [plaintiff] 
Betsy's viewpoint. 185 
Defendants' efforts to characterize the panel and assembly as 
JH2. C:./1, 226 !'.3d at 210 (Alito & Mansmann, ))., dissenting). An example of school's 
compelling interest to restrict speech that would satisfy strict scrutiny would be "material and 
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline ... such as one espousing racial hatred." I d. at 
212. 
UD. /lanscn v. Ann Arbor Puh. Schs., 293 1'. Supp. 2d 780 (E. D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2003). 
I X4. ld. at 7R5. 
I H5. !d. at ROO. 
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government speech under Hazelwood failed, for, as the court noted, "not 
a single school administrator or teacher conveyed any viewpoint or 
message at either forum." 186 The school district's other Hazelwood claim 
that it was furthering "pedagogical objectives" in "making students aware 
of minority points of view, creating a safe and supportive environment 
for gay and lesbian students"187 was roundly rejected by the court. As the 
court observed, "it [was] not educational theory or practice that [school 
district] Defendants rel[ied] upon, but rather it [was] their specific 
disapproval of the message that [plaintiff] would have conveyed that 
underlies their decision." 188 In response to the school district's claim that 
they were advancing the goal of "acceptance and tolerance for minority 
points of view," the court's stinging response was that "their 
demonstrated intolerance for a viewpoint that was not consistent with 
their own is hardly worthy of serious comment." 189 
The connection between Hazelwood and free speech is the most 
instructive part of the decision. Hansen is the first federal court to hold 
that, even though "Hazelwood itself does not specifically mention 
viewpoint neutrality, it is implicit in the Court's holding." 1911 Thus, 
school officials cannot cavalierly engage in viewpoint discrimination 
under the guise of controlling the school's educational environment. As 
the court pointedly noted, "Defendants fail[ed] to show why gays would 
be threatened or be made less 'safe' by allowing the expression of an 
opposing viewpoint, particularly when the panel included six clerics 
presenting the opposite view." 191 
Finally, the court invoked the same Lemon tripartite test that the 
Rusk court used to prohibit distribution of community organization 
religious material. In this case, however, the court found that the practice 
violated the Establishment Clause. In addition to the panel, with its 
clerics failing the first part of the test by having a non -secular purpose 
and failing the second part of the test by having a preference for "a 
particular religious view," 192 the court opined that the 
Defendants' level of involvement in this case in selecting the clergy for 
186. I d. at 794. 
187. ld. at 797. 
188. I d. at 800. 
189. ld at 801-02. (emphasis added). 
190. Id. at 798. 
191. I d. at 802. 
192. Jd. at 805. For the three parts of the Lemon test, see supra, n.95. 
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the panel, vetting the religious beliefs of the chosen clergy, recruiting 
the clergy, and providing school facilities and a captive audience of 
students for the clergy, and censoring and editing Betsy Hansen's 
speech based on its religious viewpoint, constitutes the kind of 
'excessive entanglement with religion' found by the Supreme Court to 
be constitutionally impermissible. 193 
297 
Hansen provides balance to W alz by confirming that the concept of 
neutrality, in the sense of evenhandedness, does have a place in free 
speech. While school districts have considerable authority in controlling 
their educational mission, they cannot create a limited public forum that 
only permits religious views favorable to them. Clearly, school officials 
in Hansen could have maintained control over diversity week and 
presented their views of diversity, 194 but once they opened the forum to 
outside religious speakers and other students, they crossed from 
Hazelwood to free speech viewpoint discrimination. At that point, they 
violated not only the Free Speech Clause, but the Establishment Clause as 
well. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Community groups and individual students/student groups have 
convergent, yet separable, free speech issues regarding access to public 
schools. Whether the resistance of some public schools to religious 
expression belies an attitude that "bristles with hostility to all things 
religious" 195 may never be clear. What is more important, though, is that 
the free speech rights forged by the Supreme Court in Lamb's Chapel and 
Good News have served to level the playing field for religious claimants. 
By merging the Free Speech Clause's concept of the limited public 
forum with the Establishment Clause's concept of neutrality, federal 
courts have infused free expression with the notion of evenhandedness. 
Access by religious claimants to public schools can still be restricted, and 
in some cases even prohibited, but the rules for governing access will now 
be defined under Free Speech, not under the misplaced Establishment 
Clause aphorism of a "wall of separation of church and state."196 
193. Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 806. 
194. See Downs v. LA. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a school 
could rdi.1se to permit an individual teacher to post anti-homosexuality materials in response to the 
Los Angeles Unified School District's "Gay and Lesbian Awareness Month" posters and materials 
which were provided by the central office to schools within the district and posted on a school 
bulletin board which, pursuant to actual practice and policy, was under the direct control and 
oversight of the school principal). 
195. Santa Fe Tndep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. at 318 (Rehnquist, C)., dissenting). 
196. See J;Cnerally Daniel Dreisbach, Real Threat and Mere Shadow: Religious Liberty and the 
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Religious expression, as any other kind of expression, can be 
restricted and even prohibited if it becomes disruptive to the school 
environment, but only to the extent that the alleged disruption is, 
pursuant to Tinker, material and substantial and not the product of a 
school official's personal opinion. In addition, school districts are free to 
make educational choices about the district's mission and curriculum, 
but these choices, if Hazelwood is to apply, must be those of the school 
board and school officials. Once school officials look beyond the school 
and have the school district's choices championed by persons outside the 
school or by students selected for their points of view, the school runs the 
risk of violating free speech. 
Religious groups afford unique challenges for school boards because 
such groups invariably have a viewpoint to present. To the extent that 
school districts want to prevent access by religious community groups to 
their schools, their options are somewhat limited. They can choose to 
prohibit all community groups from their schools, with whatever public 
relations impact that decision might have in the community. School 
boards also have the option, as boards did in Stafford and Goulart, of 
designating the uses of the forum; but as Good News and Bronx II 
suggest, boards cannot prohibit all religious uses while permitting non-
religious ones. What remains, then, is the delicate dance between 
viewpoint discrimination, which is prohibited, and subject matter 
exclusions, which arguably may still be permissible under Good News. 
Similarly, if school districts want to ban religious student 
organizations from their schools, they can close their schools under EAA 
to all but student organizations that are curriculum-related. Such a 
decision might not be popular with parents and students, but it invokes 
no free speech rights for non-curriculum-related groups. However, once 
a school permits a non-curriculum-related student group to meet on 
school premises, a cognizable argument can be made that the creation of 
a limited open forum under EAA automatically invokes a limited public 
forum under free speech. Once a school has passed over to a limited 
public forum, the school arguably has lost the force of Hazelwood to 
control the educational process, and is essentially left with only the 
disruptive restrictions from Tinker to limit the expression of religious 
content. 
The expressive rights of individual students are more complicated by 
the limited public forum difference between classrooms and non-
classroom areas. However, even here, school officials can close these 
First Amendment 124-27 (The Rutherford Jnst. Rpt.: Vol. 5, Crossway Books 1987), for an effective 
refutation of the view that Thomas Jefferson intended the aphorism as the definition of the 
Establishment Clause to prohibit religious activity in the public sector. 
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non-classroom areas to student expression, in effect eliminating these 
areas as limited public fora. In the alternative, school officials can 
maintain these non-classroom areas as limited public fora, subject to the 
Tinker test for disruption. Free speech does not deprive school districts 
of their right to control their schools, but it does assure that this control 
will occur in a fair and evenhanded manner. 
